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The Outsourcing of Control: Alcohol Law Enforcement, Private Sector 
Governance and the Evening and Night-Time Economy.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The study of alcohol supply and consumption is unavoidably and 
challengingly interdisciplinary. In the field of alcohol policy and public health 
some researchers have called for a renewed focus on the role of corporate 
actors as a result of recent policy developments which appear to support 
vested commercial interests (Hawkins, et al., 2012). We suggest that a similar 
and overlapping research agenda is required to explore how corporate actors 
within the alcohol industry are helping shape urban place management after 
dark. One of the authors has proposed a typology of Evening and Night-time 
Economy (ENTE) governance characterized by the assemblage of four 
overlapping modes: Type 1. law, statute and urban design; Type 2. police 
governance; Type 3. the private governance of affect; and Type 4. informal 
governance (Hadfield, forthcoming). What, however, are the social 
implications of different modes becoming variously influential in driving 
cultural and economic change within the ENTE? What is the appropriate 
balance between modes so as to achieve ‘town centres for all’? Our analysis 
here affords insight into what we believe are important changes occurring in 
England and Wales, and more recently, across the UK, that deepen and 
entrench Type 3 private governmental modes at the expense of publically 
accountable Type 1 and 2 modalities. These changes have occurred as a 
result of corporate interests ‘stepping in’ to meet self-identified needs for 
voluntary schemes and organizational structures that enhance ‘partnership 
working’ between regulator and regulated; an approach endorsed by central 
government in a period of public sector retrenchment.    
 
Exploring the drivers and potential ramifications of this ‘outsourcing of control’, 
this article draws from the findings of two empirical research studies. We 
examine how a vacuum in the delivery of traditional alcohol law enforcement 
is being filled by a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) agenda that lauds 
the status of ENTE businesses and drinks manufacturers in projects of urban 
governance, favouring a co-operative stance to legal compliance with alcohol 
licensing laws through demonstrated acts of self-regulation and 
‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996). We do not wish to deny that alcohol 
manufacturers and retailers are key stakeholders in the governance of 
drinking; controlling, as they do, the supply, development and marketing of 
alcoholic products. Our concern is to question the extent to which business 
interests should exert influence over the means by which their own trading 
environment and practices are regulated, such that law enforcement activities 
continue to support statutory intentions and the public good.    
 
In England and Wales attempts to transform negative public images of the 
ENTE may be linked to the widespread policy transfer of branded ‘kite-
marking awards’ initiatives: prominently ‘Purple Flag’ (main sponsor drinks 
manufacturing multinational, Diageo) and ‘Best Bar None’ (Bacardi Brown-
Forman Brands, Diageo, Heineken and Molson Coors). The Best Bar None 
and Purple Flag schemes are constituents of the Social Responsibility 
Alliance (SRA) a forum for collaboration between the key alcohol industry 
CSR initiatives. Both schemes link the ever-present ‘community safety’ 
agenda to a specified programme of local action, wherein town and city 
centres are rendered ‘safer’ and ‘more welcoming’ by choosing ‘options’ from 
a list of performance targets (‘metrics’). For licensed venues, attainment of 
membership ‘awards’ then becomes a bargaining tool in dealings with public 
licensing and enforcement agents. For public agencies their role in supporting 
the establishment of such schemes helps foster the impression that 
“something is being done” in their communications with local constituencies.  
 
The rise of ‘self-regulation through partnership’ and kite-marking schemes for 
the ENTE in England and Wales has occurred over the last decade alongside 
and arguably as a result of, the introduction of many new laws and initiatives 
around public disorder associated with alcohol, and the responsible sale of 
alcohol (Hadfield et al., 2009a, Hadfield and Measham, 2009). This article 
draws from research conducted by the authors in 2008 (Home Office/KPMG 
LLP, 2008) and 2010/11 (Hadfield and Measham, 2011). Our empirical focus 
is on alcohol law enforcement/implementation within the official remit of The 
Licensing Act 2003 (LA2003) and its four Statutory Objectives: the prevention 
of crime and disorder, the prevention of public nuisance, the promotion of 
public safety, and the protection of children from harm. These objectives 
structure the working practices of all those who operate and/or police and 
regulate licensed businesses in England and Wales.  
 
Our findings are considered in the light of subsequent developments in 
alcohol licensing law and alcohol law enforcement under the Coalition 
Government, tracing the trajectory of important aspects of ENTE governance 
and urban place management in England and Wales and subsequently the 
UK. The issues arising encompass the quality of life and accessibility 
concerns of many debates in urban research and planning such as the social 
functions of the night-time city, place building and place management as well 
as those of legal compliance and public health within a consumer market.   
 
 
Policy Context of the Research  
 
 
Initial readings of the amendments to alcohol licensing law introduced by the 
Coalition Government offer prima facie impressions of a more restrictive 
enforcement agenda than that pursued by the previous Labour 
administrations; a process which one legal commentator has described as 
“legislative repentance” (Light, 2010: 305), or what was officially heralded as a 
process of “re-balancing” (Home Office, 2010). However, attention to the 
outcomes and processes of alcohol law implementation (Humphreys and 
Eisner, 2010, Newton, et al., 2008) produces a more ambiguous picture to the 
impressions of ‘getting tough’ espoused in the statutory projects of both 
Labour and Coalition.   
 
Questions have been raised as to the extent to which central government has 
focused upon the introduction of new legislation at the expense of ensuring 
that sufficient attention and funding is directed toward the enforcement of 
existing laws (WSTA, 2008). As the Department of Culture, Media and Sport 
(DCMS) ‘Evaluation of the Impact of the Licensing Act 2003’ (2008: 7) 
concedes: 
 
“Our main conclusion is that people (consumers and businesses) are 
using the freedoms, but people (public sector agents) are not sufficiently 
using the considerable powers granted by the Act to tackle problems, 
and that there is a need to rebalance action towards enforcement and 
crack down on irresponsible behaviour.”  
 
The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) shows the proportion of all 
self-reported violent crimes (all categories) occurring in or near a pub or club 
has remained within a narrow range of around a fifth (17-22%) across the 
years 2003-4 to 2011-12 (ONS, 2013a). For the most recent published year 
2011-12, the figure was 20%, with 32% of incidents involving ‘Wounding’ (the 
highest figures recorded for this category over the 2003-12 period). ‘Assault 
with Minor Injury’ in or near a pub or club has seen a recorded increase from 
2008-09 onwards, with a quarter of incidents recorded as such for 2011-12.  
 
These statistics may be read against the backdrop of a flurry of legislative 
initiatives over the same decade - most prominently the LA2003 implemented 
in November 2005 - which have increased the range and strengthened the 
powers of police and local licensing authorities to act in furtherance of the 
alcohol-related harm prevention, reduction and minimization agendas (see 
Hadfield et al., 2009a). A basic prima facie correlation of the legislative activity 
and official crime statistics would suggest that these initiatives have had little 
effect (see also Humphreys and Eisner, 2014) with the apparent lack of 
progress also occurring alongside population-level declines for 2005-12 - as 
recorded by the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2013b) - in the proportion 
of adults (aged 16 and over) who drank alcohol in the week before being 
interviewed, which fell from 72% to 64% for men and 57%-52% for women in 
Great Britain (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) during this 
period, with the largest falls amongst 16-25 year olds. It is not known to what 
extent these population-level statistics indicating a general decline in alcohol 
consumption are reflected in the drinking behaviours of regular ENTE 
attendees. Local case studies have shown ENTE patrons to consume at 
levels significantly above those of the general population of their age and 
gender, whilst the general population contains increasing numbers of 
abstainers. For example in Lancashire, surveys of ENTE customers by 
Measham et al., (2011) found that young women and men each drank an 
average of 12 and 14 units respectively on a night out, approximately three 
times that recommended by national health bodies. However, in the absence 
of longitudinal ENTE-specific local and national drinking behaviour surveys it 
is not possible to draw conclusions as to any fluctuations in ENTE alcohol 
consumption nationally and how these may relate to the broadly static levels 
of violent crime occurring in or near a pub or club, as traced in CSEW self-
reporting.    
 
Over the last decade, alcohol law enforcement activity in England and 
Wales has been characterized by short-term high profile police campaigns 
heralded with advance warning to alcohol retailers. These have, for 
example, targeted crime and disorder (The Alcohol Misuse Enforcement 
Campaigns (AMECs) of 2004-07) and the ‘unlawful supply’ of alcohol by 
licensed premises (Tackling Underage Sales of Alcohol Campaign 
(TUSAC) and Responsible Alcohol Sales Campaign (RASC) of 2007) or 
some combination of both these objectives. The focus of most enforcement 
has been on ‘poorly managed premises’ that are ‘known’ to be associated 
with alcohol-related crime and disorder to check compliance with the law 
(‘bad apples’).  
 
Evidence would suggest that enforcement action in combination with drinks 
retailers’ initiatives such as ‘Challenge 21’ have had some impact in relation to 
the offence of sales, or allowing sales of alcohol to a person under 18 
(LA2003 s146/7). Under the Penalty Notice for Disorder (PND) scheme 
introduced in November 2004, fixed penalty notices of £90 (formerly £80) may 
be issued by the police for the offence of ‘sale of alcohol to those aged under 
18’. Latest published figures covering the period of June 2004 to June 2012 
show the number of PNDs issued for this offence in England and Wales as 
417 for the 12 months ending June 2005, increasing markedly to 3402 in 2006 
and peaking at 3480 in 2007, before gradually falling back to 1417 by 2012 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012). PNDs for the ‘lower tier offence’ (£60 fine) of 
‘allowing consumption of alcohol by a person under 18 years on relevant 
premises’ fell from 25 instances in June 2012 to one instance in 2012.  
 
To knowingly 'sell or attempt to sell alcohol to a person who is drunk' is an 
offence under s141 of the LA2003 - punishable on conviction by a fine of up to 
£1,000, although more often involving a PND fine of up to £90 imposed on bar 
staff, whilst ‘knowingly...obtaining alcohol for a person who is drunk’ is an 
offence under s142 of the same legislation. Figures presented by a Home 
Office spokesperson (Hardy, 2014) indicate the extent of enforcement of s141 
as ranging from 3-5 fines per year for 2010-13, with an average for this period 
of 77 PNDs per annum (see Supplement 1, Table 1). An enquiry by the Wine 
and Spirit Trade Association (WSTA, 2008:16) reported two convictions in 
2006 and one conviction in 2007 for s141 offences and that between 
November 2005, when the LA2003 came into force, and March 2008, no one 
had been found guilty, or even proceeded against, for an offence under s142 
(Parliamentary Written Answer 180410 19/03/08). These statistics are not 
generally published so it has not been possible to obtain updated figures.  
 
The Review of a Premises Licence represents an escalation of enforcement 
action that steps outside of attempts to achieve compliance by informal 
persuasion. The Home Office estimates that 800 reviews were completed in 
the year to 31 March 2013, 27% (-300) fewer than the previous year. Of these 
574 were on the grounds of ‘crime and disorder’, 268 were for ‘public 
nuisance’, 266 were for ‘protection of children’, and 165 were for ‘public 
safety’. The police were the main Responsible Authority, instigating 59% (460) 
of the total number of Reviews, with Trading Standards being the second 
most common Responsible Authority, instigating 21% (165). Environmental 
Health Officers and local residents instigated 9% (70) and 6% (47) 
respectively. Regarding the action (or actions) taken following Reviews, the 
majority (471) resulted in Conditions or modifications being added to the 
licence, 150 resulted in licence revocation and 98 resulted in a licence being 
suspended. No action was taken following 58 reviews (Home Office, 2003a). 
In relation to public drinking more generally, in 2011-2 ‘Drunk and Disorderly’ 
offences accounted for 40% of all PNDs issued, comprising the largest single 
category of PND usage (Ministry of Justice, ibid.). However, although known 
as ‘on-the-spot-fines’ and designed to reduce police bureaucracy, PNDs have 
always missed the mark in terms of their potential to assist the street-level 
policing of the ENTE, official guidance stating that: “a penalty notice will not 
be appropriate where the constable has reason to believe that the person is 
impaired by the influence of drugs or alcohol” (Home Office, 2013b: 3.52). 
The Accumulation of ‘Invisible Powers’? 
In a previous study of enforcement practices one of the authors reported how 
a particularly controversial power, the Alcohol Disorder Zone (ADZ), 
introduced by the Labour Administration in June 2008 had so far gone unused 
(Hadfield et al., 2009a). This unpopular power was removed from Statute by 
the Coalition in 2010 and replaced in October 2012 by two new, though 
similar, enforcement options: The Late-Night Levy (LNL) and the Early 
Morning Restriction Order (EMRO). Like the ADZ these powers have proved 
controversial as a result of their mandatory intervention in the alcohol sales 
market and the regulatory designation of specific tracts of urban space (and 
time), either through the imposition of a fee charged to licensed premises for 
the cost of additional policing (LNL), or in the case of EMROs, the complete 
cessation of alcohol sales within a designated area, beyond a certain time. As 
with ADZs, accompanying Home Office guidance to the legislation frames the 
creation of EMROs as actions of ‘last resort’, to be used only where other 
remedies have failed (Home Office, 2014). 
 
A survey of 99% of local authorities in England and Wales (363 in total) by 
specialist licensing solicitors Polleston Allen (2012) found that just over 6% of 
councils said they would consider introducing a LNL and 8.7% said they were 
considering an EMRO. The remaining respondent authorities had no plans to 
adopt either power. Reasons stated for reluctance to use the powers ranged 
from insufficient expected revenue from the LNL, to legal concerns over being 
the first to implement new legislation, damage to area reputation, and financial 
impacts on local businesses. During 2013/14 a number of these towns and 
cities held consultations on the introduction of LNLs and EMROs but decided 
against their adoption. At the time of writing (September 2014) four local 
authorities had adopted the Levy (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Cheltenham, 
Nottingham and the London Borough of Islington) to be applied only to those 
premises licensed to sell alcohol between 00:01 and 06:00.  
 
There are currently no EMROs. Only five towns and cities have expressed 
interest in the power. In early-2014 EMRO proposals received detailed 
consideration at 4-day committee hearings held in Blackpool and the London 
Borough of Lambeth, facing fierce opposition from local alcohol retailers, 
backed by their national trade organizations. Both authorities decided to reject 
the measure, with Lambeth councilors quoted in media reports as saying the 
powers were poorly drafted and not ‘fit-for-purpose’. It appears that history 
has repeated itself and the EMRO has followed the fate of the ADZ.  
 
Other ‘invisible powers’, prominent by omission from the practical 
enforcement repertoire have been highlighted by Light (2010) who identifies in 
the LA2003 (as amended) and its accompanying guidance (Home Office, 
2013b: 68-71) powers based on concepts such as ‘High Volume Vertical 
Drinking’ (HVVD) and ‘Irresponsible Drinks Promotion’. These powers are of 
such ill-defined nature as to have been ignored by enforcement practitioners 
on legal advice that they are incapable of withstanding detailed scrutiny in the 
case of an Appeal and therefore remaining almost wholly used.  
 
 
Aims and Objectives of our Research on Alcohol Law Enforcement  
 
These statistical trends and chains of events have, over time, indicated a 
pattern of ill-conception, inconsistency and oversight with regard to the 
operation of Type 1 and 2 public governmental modalities, whilst saying little 
about the contributory roles of private actors in Type 3. A research objective 
thus arose to explore any barriers preventing effective law enforcement and 
legal compliance within the everyday practices of leisure venues, local 
government, criminal justice agencies and other regulatory authorities within 
multi-agency networks. The aim of our research was to empirically investigate 
legislative and CSR implementation as applied to public drinking spaces and 
the operation of licensed premises. This, we hoped, would allow insight into 
how various modes of governance operated upon and across the ENTE, as 
well as how modes of governance emanating from stakeholders within this 
economy might exert influence over broader urban politics and policy 
agendas. 
In Study 1 our interviews explored clarification and understanding of the 
current regulatory regime, its scope and the various contributions of different 
agencies and groups; collaborations and tensions between stakeholders and 
their effects upon enforcement; the extent to which existing laws and 
regulations were enforced and regarded as useful, appropriate and 
proportionate; an assessment of needs in relation to improving the efficacy of 
then-current enforcement options and in relation to any future amendments to 
the enforcement regime; and the role of ‘the regulated’ and ways in which 
businesses might be better supported in achieving compliance.  
In Study 2 our aim was to record the standards of operation of licensed 
premises trading within the ENTE and to compare these activities with those 
to which drinks manufactures and retailers had committed within a published 
voluntary code of practice (WSTA et al., 2005) which the drinks industry had 
itself devised. The research instrument was designed to measure compliance 
with each of the commitments that had been made within the voluntary code.  
 
Research Design and Methodologies   
 
Both projects were commissioned by stakeholder organizations with a loose 
set of outline concerns they wished to be investigated. Study 1 was 
commissioned by The Portman Group, a not-for-profit organisation funded by 
nine drinks production companies with the remit of promoting social 
responsibility through the actions of member companies. This study involved 
semi-structured interview and documentary-based methods. An interview 
schedule (see Supplement 2) was sent with a letter of introduction in advance 
of face-to-face meetings. Interviewees were asked to comment on the 
application of a range of statutory powers categorised as Person-based, 
Place-based and Venue-based. This list of powers was developed from that 
used in an earlier study of national alcohol policy (Hadfield et al., 2009a: 469) 
and adapted to reflect the legislative environment in 2010/11. The study also 
included questions as to the operational effectiveness of CSR schemes.  
 
The authors selected a purposive sample of 40 ENTE informants and 
representatives of major stakeholder groups from across England and Wales 
(see Supplement 3). Local feelings were often idiosyncratic and sometimes 
forcefully expressed, underlining the need to respect assurances of 
confidentiality, thus all references to identifiable persons and places have 
been removed.  
 
In Study 2, the Home Office required a ‘Review of the Social Responsibility 
Standards for the Production and Supply of Alcohol Drinks’ (SRS). The SRS 
relied on the assumed effectiveness of point-of-sale inducements to drink 
without taking into account aspects of consumer context or desire. The 
Review took these assumptions at face value and sought to assess the extent 
of implementation of the SRS rather than questioning their underlying 
principles. A research team, led by the authors, planned and conducted 
observational fieldwork in licensed premises across eight English regions as 
part of a broader investigation conducted by KPMG. The locations were: 
Coventry; Hackney; Harrogate; Manchester; North Norfolk; North Tyneside; 
Restormel (Newquay); and Swindon and the research was conducted across 
each local authority district, including urban central, suburban and semi-rural 
locations. To assess how the SRS were working in practice in each location a 
team of six researchers and an observation lead carried out a series of covert 
observations across the local alcohol retail industry over a period of five days 
(Thursday to Monday) 9pm-5am, or half an hour after closing time dispersal. 
The teams conducted 726 visits across the eight locations. Some premises 
were visited more than once. The total number of premises visited was 597, 
70% (n=414) of which were on-trade ENTE premises and 30% (n=183) being 
off-trade premises, such as shops and supermarkets.  
 
Observation and recording was conducted according to explicit rules in order 
to reduce researcher bias and improve the consistency of data collection 
across the teams. We utilized an existing instrument known as the ‘Training 
Manual for Observers on the Safer Bars Study’ developed by Graham (2000). 
Permission for use of the instrument had previously been obtained for a study 
of Glasgow pubs (Forsyth, et al., 2005). The instrument was further adapted 
into a 15-page document by the authors upon authorization from Graham and 
Forsyth and is available to open access on-line in Home Office / KPMG (2008, 
Vol. 3: 52-66).      
 
Researchers were trained in the assessment of drunkenness, following 
established guidance. In support of the RASC campaign the Home Office 
provided national briefing notes to police officers on how to identify a person 
who is drunk, through aspects of their comportment including: “rambling 
conversation”, “an unkempt appearance”, “being careless with money”, 
“spilling drinks”, “fumbling for cigarettes” and “bumping into furniture” (Slade, 
2007: 5). In addition, epidemiological research reports a high degree of 
correspondence between Blood Alcohol Concentration, as an objective 
measure of intoxication, and subjective ratings of its physical manifestations 
(slurred speech, staggering gait and glazed eyes) when conducted by trained 
researchers in naturally occurring nightlife settings (Perham et al., 2007). A 
further issue was that of assessing the age of drinkers within the venues. 
Researchers were asked to record only those instances in which they 
assessed that the customers were unambiguously below the age of 18 years. 
Working through photo-elicited examples formed part of the researcher 
training, similar to server training in licensed premises. Nonetheless, our 
results may not be without error in this regard. As many venues themselves 
did not comprehensively check customer ages, we believe our results are 
indicative of compliance with the SRS in this regard.  
 
Our work was supported by our research partners KPMG who conducted 
semi-structured interviews with the 16 signatories to the SRS, together with 
industry and non-industry stakeholders in each of the eight locations. The 
views of industry and non-industry interviewees as expressed to KPMG were 
typical of generally bipartite debates on alcohol, its place in society and 
effective regulation. Industry commentators typically supported voluntary 
codes, self-regulation, partnership working and stressed the need for public 
health education and personal responsibility by consumers. Non-industry 
interviewees were generally skeptical with regard to these approaches and 
accorded successes as being driven by public sector initiatives and legislative 
interventions (Home Office/KPMG, 2008). Our observational studies were, by 
exploring compliance with the SRS in naturally occurring ENTE environments, 
intended as a counter-balance to the rehearsing of entrenched positions, 
reporting as objectively as possible on the observable evidence as to retailer 
and consumer behaviours. The purpose of our research was not to ‘catch 
businesses out’, but rather to report upon compliance with the SRS (and the 
law) in the public interest.  
 
Research activity and funding concerning the governance of drinking spaces 
is fragmented as a result of the multiplicity of overlapping jurisdictions, frames 
of reference, rights and responsibilities (Hadfield, 2006). Neither the Home 
Office nor The Portman Group sought direction over our research design or 
dissemination (see Conflict of Interest Statement). This article draws not only 
from the two studies described, but also from broader fragments of our 
sustained personal research programmes. Our objective is to present a view 
of current governmental modes with regard to UK urban night spaces that is 
informed by an awareness of competing interests and the constantly 
politicized (and often litigious) nature of debates in the alcohol regulatory field.  
 
 
Findings 
 
 
Study 1 
 
 
Our international literature review indicated that alcohol harm reduction 
initiatives had most effect when embedded within sustained local multi-
component programmes (MCPs) that drew upon a wider pool of knowledge, 
skills and resources than that of UK-style statutory ‘crime reduction 
partnerships’. Each MCP partner would need to reflect upon the capacities 
and resources at their disposal and establish clear procedures for how co-
operative work might proceed. For example, despite many areas supporting 
the ‘Cardiff Model’ (Shepherd, 2007) of data sharing between hospital 
Accident and Emergency Departments and Community Safety agents, 
interviewees expressed the view that setting up working protocols of this kind 
were an ongoing challenge. Although some national multiple retailers 
bemoaned the variety of local interpretations of the licensing laws which were 
seen as a drain on their staff training and legal resources, much of our data 
pointed to the inevitability and desirability of ‘local cultures of regulation’. Our 
previous research had highlighted the importance of key personnel acting as 
‘champions’ for particular local issues (Hadfield et al., 2009a).  
 
Policy initiatives around alcohol law enforcement at the local and national 
levels had rarely been subject to formal evaluation. National enforcement 
campaigns which had ring-fenced funding and centrally-defined objectives 
were criticized, both for their short-termism and the capacity to ride roughshod 
over locally devised and approved ways of working. In accordance with the 
paradigmatic model of ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992) a 
“stepped approach to achieving compliance” (Home Office/IoS, 2012) was 
preferred wherein businesses were offered warnings and advice on 
committing to an ‘action plan’ and only if this approach failed were they 
subject to more formal Review proceedings.  
Conditions attached to the Premises Licence were an area of tension between 
regulators and the regulated, particularly the degree to which managers and 
staff working in licensed premises adhered to, or even had knowledge of, the 
Conditions attached to their Licence. Were they, for example, compliant with 
the national Mandatory Conditions on all licences, which from 2010 onwards, 
included the requirement to offer and advertise small measures of wine and 
spirits? The purpose of this law has been to avoid unmeasured free-pouring 
and the selling of double shots of spirits and larger glasses of wine as 
standard drinks; all common practices in the UK “culture of intoxication” of the 
2000s (Measham and Brain, 2005). 
In general, our interviewees regarded the prosecution of members of the 
public for breaches of the LA2003 to be too expensive and time consuming to 
pursue. There was a perception that the courts would not support such 
prosecutions, or that the fines imposed would be minimal. Also, the 
commitment of resources to the surveillance required to obtain the necessary 
evidence for conviction was seen as disproportionately great. 
Overarching powers applied within geographically-defined boundaries, for 
example, the ability to designate Cumulative Impact Areas, were notably more 
relevant in large urban areas (Poppleston Allen, 2012). In smaller towns, 
enforcement activity more often focused on personal relationships between 
regulator and regulated (in the case of licensed premises) and the police and 
the policed (in the case of alcohol-related crime and disorder offenders). In 
the case of police powers applied to the consumers of alcohol in public 
places, a number of interviewees expressed concern regarding the 
possibilities for displacement, the tendency to recidivism and the general 
inability of area- and person-specific powers to address many of the 
underlying causes of drink-related crime and disorder by directing offenders 
toward services that might help them address their relationship with alcohol.  
The skewing of alcohol policy toward criminal justice concerns and the 
‘management of drunkenness’ was widely regarded as an institutionalized 
failure of the regulatory and enforcement landscape given the omission of any 
statutory objective relating to public health within the LA2003. From April 
2012, the Act was amended to include health bodies as ‘Responsible 
Authorities’. Such bodies can now have a say in local decisions about alcohol 
licensing, being able to make representations to the Licensing Authority, 
including the instigation of Reviews. For more detailed Study 1 findings see 
Hadfield and Measham (2011).  
 
Study 2   
 
 
Business practices frequently observed across the 414 ENTE on-licensed 
premises visited included those that discouraged moderate levels of alcohol 
consumption and in many cases actively encouraged drunkenness, such as 
drinking games, free pouring of wine and spirits, promotion of spirits-based 
shots and shooters sold as products to “down-in-one”, encouraging customers 
to ‘double up’ their shots or ‘go large’ on wine glass size when ordering, and 
general incitement to drink more quickly and to levels of intoxication by bar 
staff and DJs. We also found advertising involving sexualised imagery on 
video screens which contravened Para 56.9 of the SRS: “marketing 
communications must neither link alcohol with seduction, sexual activity or 
sexual success nor imply that alcohol can enhance attractiveness, masculinity 
or femininity” (WSTA) et al., 2005); overcrowding, broken glass and spilled 
alcohol. In some instances there was poor management of customer dispersal 
at closing time, although there were instances of very good practice. We 
observed several incidents of crime and disorder (fights and assaults) and 
public nuisance (urinating, vomiting and criminal damage).  
 
Looking more closely at two particular indicators, the law against serving 
persons known to be intoxicated and alcohol service / admission of under-
18s, we found these to be regularly flouted across all eight locations and all 
types of on-licence venues. Tables 2-4 in Supplement 1 show our findings in 
detail. On almost one-in-three of our visits (up to 50% in North Tyneside), 
perceived intoxicated people were seen to enter licensed premises, in 38% of 
visits obviously intoxicated customers were served (Table 2) and in 18% of 
visits obviously underage customers were served (Table 3) whereas in only 
8% of visits were requests for proof of age applied (Table 4). Our observers 
witnessed alcohol sales to blatantly intoxicated people (in some cases, 
customers who were too drunk to count their money to pay for their drinks 
being assisted with their purse or wallet by bar staff). Table 2 shows the 
factors associated with more frequent observations of intoxicated customers 
being served and Table 3 shows the factors associated with more frequent 
observations of underage drinkers being served: both relate to similar venue 
characteristics including cheap drinks, promotional practices, overcrowding, 
reduced seating and later trading hours.  
 
For researchers, as well as vendors, working in crowded environments with 
subdued lighting and significant background noise, the opportunity for 
comprehensive physical assessments of customer intoxication may be limited. 
Nonetheless, our findings were echoed by Hughes et al., (2014), who drew 
from a smaller sample of venues in only the North West of England and who 
used pseudo-intoxicated actors, rather than recording naturally-occurring 
customer/staff interactions. They used a similar observational instrument to 
ours, also adapted from Graham (2000). Hughes et al., found that 84% of bar 
room alcohol purchase attempts by apparently intoxicated customers resulted 
in sales, rising to 96% beyond midnight. They also found similar venue 
characteristics associated with higher sales - including reduced seating, 
cheap alcohol promotions and overcrowding, as well as additionally noise, dirt 
and bar staff and customers aged mostly under-25 - and that these variables 
were also significantly associated with each other.  
 
In terms of compliance with the law and CSR we found considerable 
differences between the eight locations as illustrated in Table 4. For example, 
observations of serving intoxicated customers ranged from under a quarter in 
North Norfolk to over half of visits in North Tyneside. Serving obviously 
underage customers varied from no observations in Hackney through to one- 
in-three visits in North Tyneside. Observations of proof of age requests 
ranged from 1% in North Tyneside through to one-in-five visits in North 
Cornwall (Restormel). 
 
We concluded that the SRS were not being consistently adopted and applied 
across the eight locations and that the commercial imperative generally 
overrode adherence. Normative and socio-economic differences between the 
various regional environments we encountered may have contributed to this 
lack of coherence. However, the SRS offered a confusing mix of regulatory 
and voluntary provisions and had a negligible impact; neither reducing bad 
practice, nor promoting good practice. Uninitiated readers of the SRS would 
not have been clear about the distinction between voluntary commitments and 
statutory requirements, with most of the former provisions simply re-stating 
the latter. From our research it appeared that both the voluntary and statutory 
frameworks for governing ENTE spaces were failing to drive good practice. 
This was due, in part, to the lack of agreed targets or outcomes and an 
absence of consistent monitoring and enforcement to evaluate progress 
toward such goals. More detailed quantitative and qualitative findings from the 
extensive database are provided in Home Office/ KPMG (2008) Vols 1-3.   
 
 
Mind the Gap, Fill the Vacuum    
 
 
Our studies of limited enforcement and implementation failure concerning 
legal instruments for the control of public drinking spaces reveal the context in 
which new regimes of place management are emerging. Through supportive 
content in the ‘small print’ of statutory guidance, Central Government appear 
happy to delegate a proportion of their role in protecting the public interest to 
private actors who might previously have been understood, primarily, as the 
targets of public regulatory intervention. For example, Home Office guidance 
on the implementation of LNL powers outlines an exemption from the levy for 
premises which participate in BIDs schemes and a 30% reduction from the 
levy for premises which participate in “business-led best practice schemes” 
(Home Office, 2012: 1.34). It is a matter of local discretion for the Licensing 
Authority as to whether or not these reductions are applied. Nonetheless, the 
guidance indicates a position of primae facie support for CSR schemes from 
the Home Office; a stance adopted despite little evidence as to the 
effectiveness of the primary CSR vehicles, beyond that of added value for 
‘partnership building’.  
 
The Purple Flag programme was developed following research conducted for 
the Civic Trust (a now defunct NGO) as disseminated in their ‘Night Vision’ 
report (Civic Trust, 2006). The scheme is now owned and run by the 
Association of Town and City Management (ACTM) a mutual organization 
with a membership that spans the private, public and third sectors. ACTM 
activities include resolving environmental, security and place-marketing issues 
on UK high streets in support of the local retail and leisure offer. The recent 
rise in prominence of Purple Flag has been dramatic having received Home 
Office endorsement and a £100,000 three-year investment from drinks 
manufacturer Diageo in 2010. As of June 2010 nine towns and cities were 
attached to the scheme, all in England. By the following year, a further seven 
had adopted Purple Flag, with a Diageo press release announcing an ‘awards 
ceremony’ for the addition of nine further areas in November 2011 (Diageo, 
2011) making a total of 25. By December 2013, the ACTM were reporting 41 
Purple Flag towns and cities across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (ACTM, 2013). The current figure, at the time of writing, is understood 
to be 43. Mark Baird, Head of Industry Affairs and Alcohol Policy at Diageo 
has commented that the purpose of the scheme is to help: “challenge 
negative stereotypes that are often associated with urban centres after dark” 
(ACTM, ibid).  
 
In a website post dated 25 June 2010, the promoters of a further prominent 
CSR initiative, ‘Best Bar None’ (BBN) explain the history of their 
accreditation scheme as follows:  
 
“It was felt that in order for progress to be made in delivering a safer 
night-time economy, a new consensual approach was required to 
enhance and complement traditional law enforcement activity. The 
objective of this approach was to provide an incentive for the operators 
of licensed premises to improve their standards of operation to the 
level of a commonly agreed national benchmark. A carrot of reward to 
counterbalance the stick of enforcement” (BBN, 2010). 
 
The origins of BBN date to a pilot award scheme devised by Greater 
Manchester Police (GMP) in 2003. In 2007 an agreement was reached 
between GMP, the Home Office and a professional training and accreditation 
body for licensed retailers, the British Institute of Innkeeping (BII), to develop 
the scheme nationally. BBN is now sponsored by four major drinks 
manufacturers and at the time of writing had been adopted by approximately 
100 towns and cities across the UK and by four locations in Canada. 
 
CSR schemes have been cited by in-house and industry-commissioned 
evaluations as helping ‘public-private partnerships’ increase relations of trust, 
co-operation, information and knowledge exchange, whilst also offering cost 
effectiveness and improved public relations (Kenyon, 2012). A fundamental 
omission in the literature to date (such that a literature exists, it is a non-peer 
reviewed ‘grey’ literature), however, is rigorous evidence demonstrating the 
mechanisms by which CSR schemes and their outcomes are assisting 
alcohol-related harm reduction as defined and directed by the statutory 
licensing objectives.  
 
BID schemes with a strong ENTE focus have also emerged in several UK 
cities, including London, Birmingham and Nottingham. These are locally 
devised schemes involving licensed retailers rather than drinks manufacturers 
and do not form part of the branded ‘kite-marking’ model of transferable CSR. 
They do, however, form part of the wider picture of increasing Type 3, private 
sector responsibility for night-time place management, providing private sector 
income streams for activities such as private security street patrols, CCTV, 
enhanced lighting and cleansing and the purchasing of additional police and 
local council resources in support of their own geographically and temporally-
bounded trading environments.  
 
Support for CSR cuts across Central Government policies on alcohol. Both 
BBN and Purple Flag are listed as ‘Community Actions to Tackle Alcohol 
Harms’ as part of the Department of Health ‘Responsibility Deal’, which seeks 
pledges of financial and other resources from drinks industry ‘partners’ in 
furtherance of public policy goals1. The Home Secretary (Home Office, 2013c) 
has “challenged” the alcohol industry to commit further resources to the roll-
out of local CSR schemes following the Government’s decision to shelve 
indefinitely the policy of minimum unit pricing for alcohol commended by 
public health lobbies. A vehicle for further CSR entrenchment has been 
established in the form of the Local Alcohol Action Area (LAAA) project which 
offers Government ‘help and advice’ with local initiatives over a 15-month 
period, but no additional public funding. 
 
Yet, in order to demonstrate relevance to the public governance of drinking 
spaces as directed by Type 1 and 2 modalities the effectiveness of these CSR 
schemes would need to be demonstrated in relation to ‘hard’ measures such 
as local crime and disorder statistics. Whilst both schemes claim within their 
publicity material to achieve success in these criteria (Purple Flag includes 
Crime and Disorder statistics in its list of ‘Key Performance Indicator Metrics’) 
neither scheme provides more than anecdotal supportive evidence. 
Alternative ‘soft’ measures of success such as partnership brokerage may 
assist in easing tensions between disparate public and private agents thrown 
together by circumstance, but are surely a distraction from the development of 
the types of evaluated Multi-Component Programmes (MCPs) that might 
demonstrably support legislative intentions, as applied in other countries such 
as Sweden and the United States (Babor, et al., 2010).  
 
Not addressed are the issues of piloting and post-hoc evaluation of CSR 
schemes in order to provide public accountability and explore issues of 
oversight or omission. We do not know the extents or limits of such schemes’ 
deliverables for the public interest, nor have the numerous local adoptions 
been subject to consultation with wider urban constituencies, to gather views, 
amongst other matters, as to the potential for agenda setting by scheme 
sponsors. Remarkably, this public democratic deficit has not dented the 
popularity of the branded CSR schemes within the UK policy transfer market. 
Public monies are scarce and the ‘partnership’ approach to ENTE governance 
is in tune with the political zeitgeist; ‘solutions’ to problems of order 
maintenance that tap the economic contributions of businesses are seen as 
‘cost effective’. Moreover, they are communicative acts (‘something is being 
done’) and being able to convey some apparently ‘good news’ about ENTE 
                                                        
1 https://responsibilitydeal.dh.gov.uk/pledges/pledge/?pl=7 accessed 22/1/14 
governance assists the professional interests of local public and private sector 
actors alike.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
Comparing the results of our empirical research with documentary analysis 
and the available statistical evidence as to the uptake of alcohol law 
enforcement powers has led us to believe that implementation is patchy and 
in many cases deficient, with the words of politicians being at odds with the 
actions of local practitioners. There may be various reasons for this, ranging 
from the extent to which some powers are not considered cost effective, or fit-
for-purpose, whilst others are considered too difficult to pursue. English and 
Welsh towns and cities now have a raft of largely untested, unloved and little 
used powers within their regulatory ‘toolkit’, a phenomenon also noted in two 
Australian States (Millar et al., 2012). The implementation deficit, together 
with poorly drafted legislation, inadequate consultation on legislative change 
and a general absence of piloting and post-hoc evaluations are, we believe, 
creating significant obstacles to the pursuit of statutory intentions and 
ultimately the public good. At the same time, the vacuum created by 
implementation failure is being filled by more subtle and collaborative 
negotiations of compliance between regulator and regulated.  
 
Drinks manufacturers’ capacity to organize their “industry affairs and alcohol 
policy” into sustained and coherent national (and international) expertise in 
lobbying and positioning in response to regulatory restraints has undoubtedly 
aided their ability to identify and develop CSR schemes. More specifically, 
branded ‘kite-marking’ schemes for the ENTE have provided corporate actors 
with opportunities to fulfill a need arising from the absence of strategic place 
management roles with local public policy networks and a perennial lack of 
cash for “traditional law enforcement activity”. More broadly, off-the-shelf 
‘solutions’ friendly to the interests of alcohol-led ENTE businesses and the 
drinks manufacturers who supply them chime with central government 
aspirations for increased private sector responsibilisation. CSR scheme policy 
transfers attempt to steer local practice and policy towards an externally 
imposed template and an agenda that is framed by centralized private sector 
concerns. The new forms of standardizing private sector influence now pose 
important challenges to the knowledge base; wherein earlier research had 
explored the governance of drinking spaces largely through the lens of local 
public sector actors negotiating their own course through legislative regimes 
and guidance (Hadfield, et al., 2009b).  
 
A little discussed corollary of these trends is the removal of public 
accountability mechanisms as operating through the usual channels of local 
consultation and independent evaluation: a push towards Type 3 private 
modes of governance and away from Type 1 and 2 public governmental 
processes (Hadfield, forthcoming). Whilst new private funding streams flow in 
the directions approved by CSR scheme organizers, the failures to implement 
public policies concerning the control of ENTE drinking spaces remain.  
 
Presuming that a market-driven neo-liberal mode of governance for the night-
time city will remain, hopes for the transformation of nightlife appear to rest on 
a re-development-led approach which encourages new economic players 
drawn from the retail and cultural sectors, the performing arts, dining/cuisine, 
cinema and health and lifestyle services. Alcohol retailers must inevitably play 
some role in ENTE governance, however, public policies, primarily those of 
city governments, are required to nudge existing businesses in the direction of 
difficult and transformative re-investments. This assumes, of course, that 
entrepreneurs can identify new ‘markets’ (potentially new audiences) for such 
changes, whilst resisting the temptation to exploit existing drink-led 
opportunities such as ‘branded’ student nights (see Hubbard, 2013). The co-
operation of investors, within a free market, will be voluntary.   
 
Our hope in this article is to demonstrate why urban studies research on 
ENTE security governance must focus on the nuances of policy 
implementation if it is to meaningfully engage with real world issues and help 
guide thought on more enlightened futures for the night-time city. To equate 
policy action with policy implementation, for example, would be to swallow the 
pill of official discourse. The need for ‘culture change’ with regard to the alco-
centric focus of the ENTE in British towns and cities is a familiar trope within 
academic discourse, including that of the research that informed Purple Flag.  
The Civic Trust and their advisors proposed that museums, libraries and other 
such public institutions might open later in order to counter the commercial, 
alco-centric nature of the ENTE (Civic Trust 2006, Davies, 2010). However, 
since that time, an extended outsourcing of control to major drinks companies 
and alcohol retailers has created, we believe, further obstacles to the effecting 
of genuine social and economic diversification, increased accessibility and 
cultural transformation in towns and cities after dark. In nurturing any such 
latent demand for more diversified ENTEs, the British appear to have lost 
sight of the essential contribution of effective alcohol law enforcement in 
providing the base line supportive conditions for such progress.    
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